How the UK can step up in the Indo-Pacific
Extensive global networks mean the UK is well-placed to play a bigger role in Asia if it can leverage its partnerships and alliances
Having been back in the UK for three years, after 14 years in Asia, I’ve been able to see the country of my birth through an outsider-insider perspective. Familiar enough with weird British traditions and behaviour to not be totally befuddled. But bringing a distant, comparative lens having lived in many different places, from China to Indonesia and Vietnam to Australia.
That has helped give me clarity when thinking through what kind of role the UK can - and should - play in the world. The debate here, like most debates everywhere, tends to be framed around a false dichotomy. Either the UK can still strut the world stage like the great, imperial power it once was (Rule Britannia, etc) or it has shrivelled into peripheral irrelevance (we’re just Denmark with the English language and without the EU [sorry Denmark]).
The prosaic truth lies somewhere in the between the poles. But not in the middle, in this case, because the UK has many advantages that other countries can only dream of: having a global language, a global financial centre, a world-leading capital city, some of the world’s best knowledge production institutions from universities to media organsiations (and, ahem, think-tanks), universally appreciated culture from bands to literary figures, a high-tech military with global reach and strong alliances (and strained budgets). On top of that, the UK sits in many different bodies and groups that give it the ability to have outsized influence if it can work with partners: it has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it’s in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership, NATO, AUKUS, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, it’s a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, a member of the CPTPP, home to the Commonwealth.
The challenge is what to build on these great foundations - and how to do so. If we simply take them for granted, they will be eroded as other powers rise, especially in Asia.
In a new Chatham House policy paper with my colleagues Olivia O’Sullivan and Chietigj Bajpaee, we argue that the UK is not taking the Indo-Pacific seriously enough, given how important it will be for our future. We also set out how we think the UK can realistically do more in these fiscally constrained and geopolitically fragmented times.
Read the full paper here: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/why-indo-pacific-should-be-higher-priority-uk
Here’s the summary of key findings:
The early actions of the Trump administration have forced the UK to focus urgently on European defence and security. Yet the Indo-Pacific, as one of the most dynamic and geopolitically contested regions in the world, also deserves to be a key foreign policy priority for the UK government.
The region is critical for British interests because it encompasses security risks affecting the UK, presents vital long-term economic opportunities, and is vulnerable to climate risks that – if not mitigated – will have a major impact on the world. The Indo-Pacific is also home to several middle powers with shared interests in upholding climate, security and trade norms. The links and alliances between these states will be critical to effective cooperation, particularly given the increased unpredictability around US foreign policy.
Getting its approach to the Indo-Pacific right will also help the UK to manage the challenges of a more powerful, assertive and globally influential China. Despite limited capacity to shape Beijing’s actions directly, the UK can influence the neighbourhood in which China resides by working with partners to establish and enforce shared norms, and to support regional countries’ sovereignty and resilience.
Previous UK governments have aspired to deeper diplomatic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the current Labour government maintains a broad commitment to this ideal. But while the case for more fully recognizing the importance of the region has been made before, this paper sets out how that focus can be updated, refined, and aligned with the UK’s other foreign policy priorities. In a time of straitened government resources and plentiful calls on ministerial attention, it is critical that UK policymakers see the region not in isolation but as a source of partnerships and linkages that can advance wider British interests. The UK should use this ‘network power’, in cooperation with like-minded governments, to make a decisive impact in the region.
The paper recommends dividing the UK’s Indo-Pacific policy around three broad thematic/geographical groupings, and setting strategic priorities for each:
Among the ‘Indo-Pacific Four’ – Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea – we suggest that the UK needs to defend key partnerships from a volatile US and build closer ties on trade and economic security. Ensuring the viability of AUKUS – the military procurement and technology-sharing agreement between Australia, the UK and the US – should be one such priority. The UK and the Indo-Pacific Four also need to coordinate their offers of security and development support to other states in the region, to avoid undercutting each other’s approaches and to ensure best use of limited resources.
Southeast Asia presents singular opportunities to expand UK trade and investment, as countries in this subregion collectively represent one of the world’s most stable, most cohesive and fastest-growing emerging market blocs. But economic cooperation prospects could be undermined by risks from climate change, rising geopolitical pressures and supply-chain fragmentation. As China seeks to entrench its Indo-Pacific dominance, and as Southeast Asian governments fret about US trade protectionism, the UK can and should offer more options to Southeast Asian partners in terms of economic and security cooperation.
In South Asia, the UK needs to build on its successful conclusion of a limited trade deal with India to widen the scope of bilateral cooperation in a way that leverages both countries’ broader foreign policy priorities (e.g., engagement with the US and the Global South). The UK must also recognize the risks to India’s growth and stability from challenges affecting South Asia more generally, such as a lack of trade integration and the potential for crisis and conflict. Two examples of these risks were the ouster in 2024 of the India-friendly government of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, and the terrorist attack in Kashmir in April 2025 that triggered hostilities between India and Pakistan.
An effective Indo-Pacific strategy across these three groupings will require more expansive UK cooperation with European allies, which share similar objectives to the UK yet lack the resources to make decisive impacts alone. The UK should build on work done with France and other European allies to coordinate naval visits to the Indo-Pacific, ensuring that support on maritime security is more coherent and that such support complements the offerings of other European partners. In the economic sphere, there is great potential for the UK, EU partners and the Indo-Pacific Four to do more together – whether supporting a rules-based trading system, aligning development assistance at a time of shrinking budgets, or imposing a more coherent structure on the plethora of infrastructure and climate finance initiatives targeted at the region.
Finally, the UK government needs to build a clearer public and political narrative about why the country has interests in the Indo-Pacific and how it will pursue them. This may help to win over the many officials in the Indo-Pacific who are keen to see Britain do more but are unclear about the UK’s intentions and depth of commitment. Compelling communication of the rationale for UK engagement is also necessary domestically to ensure wider buy-in across government, in the UK business community and with the broader public for an ambitious, long-term Indo-Pacific strategy.