Why the UK needs to diverge from Washington on China and Indo-Pacific policy

Donald Trump is symptom as much as accelerant of America's turn inwards and, in the coming years, the UK will need to formulate a more independent and less US-flavoured foreign policy

My colleague William Matthews and I recently submitted evidence to the House of Lords’ International Relations and Defence Committee inquiry into the UK’s future relationship with the US.

We tried to look beyond the latest noise and Truth Social posts to address how the political direction of travel in the US will impact the UK’s approach to China and the Indo-Pacific - and what the UK should do about it.

Check it out below:

The UK will need to diverge from the US on China and Indo-Pacific strategy as US-China competition intensifies

The UK needs a strategy for a post-rules-based international order

1. In the aftermath of the high costs of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the global financial crisis, Barack Obama prompted the US to focus more on the mounting problems at home, rather than the messy outside world. Although there have been many ups and downs, there has been a clear trendline since Obama took power in 2009 for the US to temper its foreign ambitions and put domestic issues higher up the priority list. From the first Trump term through the presidency of Joe Biden, the US has also embraced more protectionist economic policies and looked to wind down its engagement in the multilateral system.

2. The rules-based international order was historically unusual, and the product of overwhelming US power post-1945 and post-1989. Such an order relies on a single hegemonic power and cannot be sustained without one. While the case can be made that like-minded countries could work together in an attempt to uphold it, increasingly divergent economic and security interests (and historical precedent) make this unrealistic. The US itself is unlikely to return to a position of international leadership post-Trump.

3. US focus on national strength and self-interest is likely to continue beyond the Trump administration regardless of the party in government. This is a function of the US’ declining relative power and its transition from a role as global hegemon to one of several major powers (including China as direct competitor but also in relation to Russia, India, Brazil, and others). Pre-1945 international politics is likely to be a better guide to US behaviour in the context of great power competition and shifting, pragmatically-driven alignments

4. In this context, the UK will need to learn how to work with a much broader range of less like-minded partners in multilateral institutions. Although the UK government is expanding its cooperation with rising Asian powers such as India, Indonesia and Vietnam, these countries often have divergent views on key global issues such as human rights, energy and climate change policy, and trade rules. As they gain greater influence in global institutions, the UK will have to develop new habits of cooperation with these sometimes uneasy partners. That will mean understanding how to navigate differences, as well as aligning.

5. The influence of multilateral institutions reliant on US power, including the Bretton Woods institutions, will decrease significantly as participation ceases to be in the US’ self-perceived interests. Looser, more pragmatic arrangements like BRICS will increasingly become the norm, functioning as for a for dialogue but unable to enforce global rules and norms.

6. The UN is likely to survive but evolve, and the possibility of US withdrawal from the UN in the medium- to long term should not be discounted. China will seek to deepen its international influence via the UN, including through gaining support for its perspectives on core interests like Taiwan by cultivating member state votes, and by attempting to embed Chinese concepts into UN language, particularly concerning Beijing’s Global Initiatives (Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative) as an alternative framing to the US-led order.

7. The UK should be willing to use its status as a P5 country to counter unwelcome Chinese influence where it can, but also recognise the limits of its influence. Prioritising achievable outcomes through pragmatic engagement with China and other countries will be much more important and impactful in securing UK interests than a commitment to a ‘rules-based order’ in the abstract.

To ensure a role in the Global South amid the US retreat and increasing Chinese influence, the UK should reverse its decision to cut foreign aid

8. US retreat will likely leave China as the key development partner across the Global South by default. China does not have the resources or inclination to fully fill the role the US has done, but its close relationships with countries across the Global South and its existing provision of infrastructure and digital infrastructure mean that it is well positioned to increase its influence, including in areas such as emerging technologies, AI governance, and provision of renewable energy technologies.

9. The UK’s decision to cut its aid budget in the wake of the swingeing cuts to USAID was a mistake, undermining the UK’s pitch to the Global South as a pragmatic but committed development partner and making the UK appear as if it was trying to curry favour with Trump. The British government should reverse the cut as soon as possible and deepen its engagement with other non-US donors such as Japan, France and Germany to work out how the gaps left by Washington can best be filled.

The UK should work with the US on China where interests align, but be willing to depart significantly where interests diverge

10. While Donand Trump may flip-flop between confrontation and seeking a deal with Beijing, US-China competition is likely to be a long-term feature of Washington’s foreign policy. Although the UK shares many overlapping interests with the US when it comes to China, the British government should shape its own China policy rather than following parameters set by Washington.

11. Although the UK often seeks rhetorical alignment with the US on China, the government needs to develop a much clearer sense, especially behind closed doors, of where US and UK interests converge and diverge on China. One primary point of divergence that must be better understood is that Washington is seeking to preserve its global primacy, including by keeping China down where necessary, whereas the UK’s interests with regards to China are much more narrowly defined.

12. Because the UK does not share this interest and cannot compete with China economically, technologically, or militarily in the long run, it should prioritise securing national interests where it can and adapting to a world of relatively greater Chinese and lesser US influence.

13. The UK and US will continue to share an interest in national security cooperation when it comes to countering Chinese espionage, influence operations, cyber and other greyzone threats, and transnational repression.

14. However, it should be noted that while the UK shares an interest in countering growing Chinese military power, China does not pose a direct military threat to the UK. This could be an area of increasing friction going forward, particularly in the event of a US-China conflict; direct involvement in such a conflict is highly unlikely to be in the UK’s interests, particularly because the later it occurs, the more likely China will be to win.

15. The potential for UK cooperation with the US on economic and technological resilience will remain but carry increasing risks for the UK, which in the long-run would do better to favour increased cooperation with other US allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Risks arising from continued or greater UK-US cooperation on these issues include: increased dependence on the US in a global tech landscape increasingly bifurcated between the US and China; risk of China rapidly overtaking the US and leaving the UK with limited access to cutting-edge technology; the inherent asymmetry of economic power in the US-UK relationship leading to limited opportunity to advance UK-specific interests on China. It would also limit the scope for the UK to pursue digital sovereignty (see below).

16. Closer UK engagement with China is likely to cause friction with the US. However, it will almost certainly be necessary in areas of mutual interest, such as climate change and AI governance. It will also be increasingly desirable to ensure UK access to advanced technology in areas where China leads and will continue to outpace the UK and allies, such as electric vehicles and robotics. The reality facing the UK is one of balancing relations with two superpowers in a more transactional world.

17. It should be noted that China largely perceives UK foreign policy as an extension of US foreign policy. This is an obstacle to effective UK-China engagement, and increases the risk of the UK being targeted coercively by China amid China-US tensions.

The UK should maintain a commitment to engaging the Indo-Pacific regardless of US policy there or in Europe

18. US withdrawal from Europe will likely mean that the UK will need to devote its defence resources to European security, and will raise questions regarding the utility of resource-intensive operations in the Indo-Pacific (e.g. sending carrier strike groups). But this should not mean that the UK neglects the Indo-Pacific diplomatically, economically, or in relation to common security concerns – on the contrary, a changing relationships with the US and concerns with China’s influence will mean that the UK and other middle powers including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea would benefit by combining resources to build mutual economic and technological resilience while mitigating risks of being caught between US-China competition.

19. In the broader Indo-Pacific region, the UK should work with the US, alongside other US allies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, to help countries boost their own economic, political and security resilience in the face of a rising China and other emerging threats such as climate change. This will be difficult during the Trump administration, given its unilateral approach and its massive cuts to international development assistance. But, in the longer term, the UK and the US have shared interests in supporting the growth of a more geopolitically balanced region, where China cannot so easily dominate, and promoting more open trade and investment regimes, which can benefit regional partners as well as the US and UK.

20. The UK must avoid calls for a “division of labour” on security, where the US takes on the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific, while European states confront Russia in Europe. As stated above, the UK needs its own sovereign policies for China and the Indo-Pacific, rather than subcontracting out to the US. The deep links between Europe and the Indo-Pacific mean that it would be a mistake to carve China and the Indo-Pacific out of British foreign and security policy.

The UK is at significant risk from future US coercion, and should take steps to reduce dependence inspired by derisking from China

21. Even though the structures and bureaucracies that sustain the US-UK alliance will likely survive the second Trump term intact, trust will be damaged by the US President’s transactional style and disregard, if not distaste, for alliances. The UK government is seeking to avoid Trump’s ire but, even if it succeeds, his actions and words will undermine confidence in the broader US alliance system, among allies, partners and adversaries.

22. The UK is particularly at risk from a more transactional or even coercive approach from the US due to the extent of US involvement in the UK economy, dependence on US systems for defence, and reliance on US technology. The effect of the US decision to suspend intelligence sharing with Ukraine, including via private US companies like Maxar, should be a wake-up call. For years, analysts have warned of the risks of coercion posed by reliance on Chinese technology; the possibility of a more transactional US using technological dependence in this way cannot be discounted, and the UK should consider analogous derisking measures.

23. On digital platforms, and AI specifically, the UK should be wary of close technological cooperation with the US in the long term. The risks presented by Chinese AI and other digital systems are well known – including data exposure and the potential for the Chinese Communist Party to influence and censor content. Reliance on US systems poses similar risks, especially as national interests diverge – the ability of Elon Musk, now one of the most powerful figures in the US administration, to single-handedly shift domestic political debate through his comments on the grooming gangs scandal illustrates this, as does the aggressive posture of the new US administration on conflating use of US platforms with fundamental values questions. As generative AI is likely to be increasingly influential in terms of content creation and distribution, reliance on foreign technology poses an increasing risk to the independence of the UK’s democratic norms and civil liberties.